things the gods possess are always at their disposal and so are not up to them, viz. beyond praise, because praise can only be given to what has been acquired through efforts based on a choice between what is, and what is not, good. Accordingly, the qualities the gods possess are to be honoured and blessed, not praised: re xod Twv È.1tOtLV?'tWV &¡Ot8wv ËXOV't0t2 (Fat. ch. 32, XPEL't-COUq iialv fi È.1tOtLVOUÇ xac ia scp olq OL Ë1tOtLVOL XOt'top86>flOt't0t. Sharples translates: "Acting rightly would not be applied to the gods in the strict sense, but as equivalent to 'doing what is good'...".' Thillet translates: "Quant au bien agir, au sujet des dieux, on ne le saurait dire au sens propre, mais bien en lui donnant le sens qu'ils sont les auteurs des biens...".5 Neither Sharples nor Thillet adequately translates the word before eaov, or explains what is meant by the "strict sense" or "sens propre". Alexander's main point is of course clear. Morally right actions (note that he uses the Stoic technical vocabulary and recall that in this treatise the Stoics are his main opponents: a neat turning of the tables) cannot really be attributed to the gods, because they have no choice -there is nothing that is up to thembut simply cannot not be good, and so cannot make moral mistakes again the Stoic technical term). Furthermore, Alexander does not say or imply that the "doing" or rather "making" of good things could be attributed to the gods in the "strict sense"; all he says is that "in a way" the improper attribution to the gods of actions that are morally right is somehow equivalent to affirming that their works are good. This of course recalls the ancient argument, first found at Xenophon, Mem. IV 3, concerned with the understanding of God, or of the gods, that may be derived from the observation of his (or their) operations in the universe: the knowledge of the divine, or of the gods, through their works. I
In his commentary, Sharples remains silent on the expression 06 According to Thillet's index verborum, this is the only place in Fat. where is connected with the verb ÀÉ¡?cr8OtL. This terminology, as we shall see, is technical. Alexander exploits it to further his polemical purpose. Throughout the treatise, existing modes of argument of whatever provenance are cleverly exploited and adapted the better to underpin the Aristotelian libertarian point of view concerned with human responsibility, or liability, and to undermine that of the determinist opponents.
The earliest authority for the expression in a theological context is Philo, De mutatione nominum 27: &XX& Yap o66' ixE7tvo 1tpocrTjx?v 6<1 To dyi Oe6q [cf. Gen. 17: 1 ] .?e ?Y ?Tac xOt'tOtxpr¡cr'tLXWÇ 013 Earlier in the same treatise , Philo has pointed out that no 6voya X6ptOV7 can be predicated of What Truly Is, but that God allows mankind to use certain appellations, however improper these may be sub specie aeternitatis
The next parallel is to be found in Clement of Alexandria, again in a context which deals with the proper and less proper though still permitted ways of speaking about God, Strom. V xii 82.1: x&v oc6T6 [scil., the ineffable God] ou xuptco,; x«ioxvcsg a?,u6 ?'tOL iv '? TaYa9ov
Yet, in the less proper way, we may according to Clement still call God good, or Creator. The philosophical epistemic theology at issue is beyond any doubt of Middle Platonist provenance; it survives in its most complete form in Alkinoos, Didaskalikos ch. 10. Here, three ways of knowing the First God are
